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The Kremlin’s “hybrid war” on the Revolution of Dignity has been distracting 
pro-Western forces, in Ukraine’s civil society, public administration and 
Western diaspora, from pushing through reforms. 
 
By Andreas Umland 
 
How can one explain the contradictory picture of today Ukraine – a country with a loudly 
announced reform agenda, yet with reformers leaving government? 
 
On the one hand, Kyivan boasts first successes in the implementation of its “Strategy 
for Reforms 2020” adopted in July 2014. In this program, the Ukrainian government 
identified 62 national reform measures to be conducted over the coming years. And, 
indeed, a number of consequential laws have been promulgated: on lustration, fighting 
corruption, procurement, restructuring of the civil service, modernization of higher 
education, creation of a new police force, introducing public broadcasting, etc. Four new 
anti-corruption agencies are currently being established that will be exclusively engaged 
with combating sleaze and bribery. In formulating these laws, the government in Kyiv 
has worked together with Ukrainian civil society as well as international advisors, among 
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 them a special EU Advisory Mission and the Venice Commission of the Council of 
Europe.  
 
Moreover, there are worth-mentioning reforms on the regional and local levels. Many 
Ukrainian districts (oblasts), cities and even villages are currently changing their public 
administration for the better, already before implementation of Kyiv’s decentralization 
agenda. In some cases, the regions and communities reform in close cooperation with 
pro-Western forces in Kyiv. In others, local reform activists act independently from 
reformist moves in Kyiv. In a number of regional governments, like the Odessa Oblast 
Administration, the local changes are ahead or even go beyond the reforms conducted 
in Kyiv. 
 
On the other hand, Ukraine is today in the midst of a political crisis triggered not by 
these progressive changes. On the contrary, the slow implementation and constant 
subversion of reforms within the central government and parliament have recently led to 
a deep schism in Kyiv’s ruling elite. After ominous signs during preceding months, 
Ukraine’s respected Economy Minister Aivaras Abromavicius stepped down on 3 
February 2016 triggering an earthquake within the political class. Abromavicius explicitly 
protested against backroom deals he was asked to agree to, and brought the growing 
frustration of Ukraine’s reformist governmental officials to the surface.   
 
Ukraine’s state thus has yet to be transformed. Not only have the post-Euromaidan 
promises of quick and comprehensive reforms not been fulfilled. The old kickback 
system and state-business networks are reasserting themselves under new disguises. 
Ironically, this is happening in spite of the anti-oligarchic pathos of the Revolution of 
Dignity of 2013-2014andreformist agenda of the post-Euromaidan government, as well 
as against the background of a mobilized civil society and Western diaspora.  
 
The standard explanation for this glaring contradiction is valid, yet incomplete:Ukraine’s 
post-Soviet corruption networks are fighting back, old habits and structures have 
survived, and Kyiv’s new political leadership is clearly not as transformational as the 
2014 revolutionaries thought. Yet, how to explain the paradox that the reform crusaders 
of the Euromaidan have, so far, been unable to overcome the old oligarchic system?  
 
Three reasons for this failure stand out:  
 
1st– Russia’s aggression against Ukraine:  
 
Moscow’s military expansion has had multi-faceted socio-economic consequences for 
Ukrainian society, including its capacity for radical change. Thousands of Ukrainians – 
among them many selfless patriots – have been killed, mutilated, wounded or/and 
traumatized by the war. Ukraine lost two economically important territories. The 
annexation of Crimea and occupation of parts of the Donets Basin has been 
accompanied by expropriation of production facilities, confiscation of state and 
corporate property, destruction of infrastructure, and transfer of Ukrainian industrial 
equipment as well as other valuables to Russia. Ukraine had to redirect large portions of 
 its already scarce financial, material and human resources from the civilian to the 
military sector, as well to post-war restoration.  
 
The war and various related challenges had consequential repercussions for the activity 
of Ukraine’s civil society and diaspora in the West. Highly mobilized by the Euromaidan, 
the tens of thousands of activists no longer focused their primary efforts on the rebirth of 
the country. Instead of reforming Ukraine, the question of the state’s mere survival 
moved to the forefront of concern for many Ukrainian civic groups. Fighting or 
supporting the war against Russia – instead of transforming their motherland – became 
now most Ukrainian revolutionaries’ mission number one. Facing a ruthless and 
powerful foreign enemy, consolidation of state, society and big business rather than 
segregation of government from oligarchs was and is Ukraine’s main task of the day.  
 
Yet, another daunting challenge was soon added – alleviation of the physical and 
psychological suffering experienced by the thousands of soldiers and civilians affected 
by the war, as well as by their families. In 2014-2015, Ukraine’s civil society should have 
been concentrating on improving legislative projects, promoting international economic 
ties, uncovering corruption networks, developing education programs, identifying 
wasteful spending, or coming to terms with difficult historical issues. Instead, most 
activists, mobilized in winter 2013-14, have been engaged in work tied to the war effort, 
helping IDPs, restoring destroyed infrastructure, and related tasks.  
 
2nd– An economic crisis brought about by war:  
 
This already difficult situation was compounded by an unusually severe collapse of 
GDP, real incomes and the national currency, the Hryvnia, during the years 2014-15 – 
mainly, but not exclusively, as a result of the war. Even before Russian aggression, 
Ukrainians were extremely poor. But in the course of two years of a bloody war against 
Europe’s largest military power, they have become the poorest people in Europe – even 
behind Albanians and Moldovans.   
 
On top of this, there was a simultaneous rapid increase in power, gas and heating costs 
– a condition imposed by the International Monetary Fund for disbursal of its standby 
loans. To be sure, the painful measure has been overdue. Yet, this drastic 
macroeconomic adjustment during wartime further exacerbated the shock effect of the 
already severe financial and social collapse experienced by the population since the 
beginning of the Russian intervention. The enormous surge in communal fees has not 
only reduced private consumption, investment and comfort. It has also put many civic 
activists in more difficult economic conditions, reduced the popular support for the 
government’s Westernization agenda, and facilitated the rise of irresponsible political 
populism.   
 
3rd– Non-military instruments of Moscow’s intervention:  
 
Ukraine is and was not only the victim of a traditional armed aggression. In parallel, 
Russia is also conducting a non-military and multi-vector hybrid war against Ukraine 
 that is only partially visible to, and not fully understood in, the West. This – sometimes, 
purposefully covert – subversion of the Ukrainian state is being pursued through 
economic sanctions, secret intelligence operations, international propaganda 
campaigns, purposeful cyber-attacks, diplomatic interventions, political pressure, 
clustering of troops on the Russian-Ukrainian border, and so on.   
 
Possibly the most important aspect of the Kremlin’s“non-linear” warfare is not its 
immediate effects as much as the underlying socio-psychological and politico-economic 
calculus. Ukrainians should be worn down by being held in a state of suspense over 
years – stuck between calm and tension, between war and peace, between insecurity 
and stability. This should especially create volatility and frustration in the Russian-
speaking regions bordering Russia, as well as the Black and Azov Seas. Local 
entrepreneurs should be discouraged, university graduates disillusioned, civil society 
activists unsettled, international partners made nervous, and foreign investors scared 
off.  
 
These significant new challenges for Ukrainian society altered the public and private life 
of most Ukrainians – including the socially more active ones – in 2014-2015. Obviously, 
neither the Russian armed forces’ aggression, nor the Kremlin’s other agencies’ non-
military interventions in Ukraine, and their various after-effects can be excuses for the 
slow pace of reforms undertaken by Ukraine’s government and president. Yet, 
Moscow’s hybrid war against Kyiv and its multifarious economic, social and 
psychological effects had also important repercussions for Ukraine’s transition. In 
particular, it changed the “correlation of forces” in Ukrainian society’s struggle with its 
corrupted state administration and irrational economic structure. Had Russia respected 
the sovereignty, integrity and European choice of its “brother nation,” we would have a 
very different Ukraine today. 
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